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Part III
THE SUBVERSIONS AND PERVERSIONS 
OF SHADOW VIGILANTISM
The loss of moral credibility through perceived gross failures of justice can provoke ordinary people (chapters 8 and 9 below) and officials within the criminal justice system itself (chapter 10) 
to take action to force from the system the justice that the system seems 
reluctant to impose. And, as we will see in part IV, the manipulations 
and distortions of the system by which this is done—through what might 
be called acts of shadow vigilantism—commonly provoke their own dis-
torting response, leading to a downward spiral of disillusionment and 
subversion (chapter 11).
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COMMUNITY COMPLICITY WITH VIGILANTES
Part II focused on the people who, frustrated with perceived failures of the criminal justice system, take the law into their own hands to impose the justice that the system is unwilling or unable to impose. 
But as we hinted in chapter 4, these classic vigilantes, as they might be 
called, are not the real problem. It is the reaction of the broader public 
that can be more troublesome.
To gain a sense of how the same vigilante impulse that inspires the 
classic vigilante can influence a broad cross section of the larger commu-
nity, consider these two case studies.
A FRUSTRATED NEIGHBORHOOD HIDES A KILLER
The Assassination of William Malcolm
In 1981 William Malcolm is living in East London with his wife and her 
two children, a six-year-old stepdaughter and a nine-year-old stepson. He 
sexually abuses both of his stepchildren on a regular basis. He is caught, and 
during the trial it comes to light that he has been abusing his stepdaughter 
since she was three years old. Malcolm is given a two-year jail term.1
Since England does not, at this time, have a pedophile registry system 
or laws that allow restrictions to be placed on convicted sex offenders’ 
movements, when released in 1984, Malcolm returns to the same house 
and resumes life with the same two children whom he was convicted of 
abusing. Before the end of the year, he is again charged with abusing his 
stepchildren, as well as other young victims from the neighborhood; 
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again he is convicted and sent to jail. Upon his second release, Malcolm 
moves in with a new girlfriend and her five children.
Malcolm continues to abuse children. In one instance, he tracks 
down a former victim who testified against him in a previous trial and 
rapes her again. He tells her that she is “asking for it” because she helped 
send him to jail.2
In 1994 Malcolm is once again charged with sexually abusing chil-
dren. The charges involve thirteen different children, including children 
who are living with Malcolm. Among the charges are multiple instances 
during which children are “tied to a bed and forced to perform sex acts.”3 
Details of some incidents include Malcolm placing his shoeless young 
victim in a bedroom and then spreading carpet tacks on the floor outside 
the room so he can be alerted if the victim tries to escape. It is also reported 
that Malcolm frequently beats his victims with a belt.
Prior to prosecution for the latest charges, Malcolm undergoes a psy-
chological evaluation, which determines that he is a sexual psychopath. 
The report describes him as having pedophile tendencies of a “strongly 
sadistic nature.”4 Social workers suggest that he is “incurably psycho-
pathic and violent.”5 At trial, the judge describes the crimes as “unspeak-
able” but concludes that there can be no trial for the new offenses because 
his two previous convictions make it impossible for him to receive a fair 
trial.6 The judge explains that victims of the offenses cannot realistically 
be expected to testify without mentioning previous abuses they have suf-
fered from him and that this type of testimony will be prejudicial to the 
defendant. Malcolm is released from custody without restriction.
The victims and neighbors are not happy with the court’s refusal to 
even try Malcolm. A female victim expresses disbelief: “The judge says 
he is not going to get a fair trial because of his history, but surely it’s 
that history which proves what a dangerous man he is.”7 A male victim 
complains, “I didn’t have a childhood. I was petrified of him.”8 In court, 
furious cries of “kill the pervert” come from the public gallery. Upon 
being set free, Malcolm receives death threats.
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Malcolm moves to a block of flats in Manor Park that overlook a 
common area where children frequently play. Sharing the apartment with 
him is his current girlfriend and her children, three of whom are under the 
age of six. By lying about his background, Malcolm obtains a job across 
the street from a primary-grade school. Residents of Manor Park are out-
raged when they learn that Malcolm lives there. One neighbor explains, 
“You can’t do what he did without creating an awful lot of enemies.”9
On February 18, 2000, at around 10:00 p.m., Malcolm answers the 
door of his flat and is shot in the face. No one else is home at the time. 
Neighbors rush out when they hear a gunshot and find him lying on the 
floor still breathing but bleeding profusely. An ambulance arrives, but 
Malcolm is pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
The case is not different from others considered previously in which 
vigilantes take the law into their own hands when the law shows itself 
unwilling to punish serious wrongdoing. But what happens next illus-
trates another dimension of vigilante action.
News of Malcolm’s killing is greeted with jubilation. As one neighbor 
explains, “I’m quite happy that people like him are out of this community. 
I can understand quite clearly why someone would want to have him out 
of the way.”10 Another neighbor reports, “Nobody will feel sorry, except 
maybe his relatives. I was shocked when I heard someone had been shot 
on the doorstep like that, but when I heard it was him I was relieved.” 
In fact, Malcolm’s relatives are not feeling sorry about the killing. Andy, 
Malcolm’s brother, says, “I want to shake hands with his killers. . . . He 
was vermin, I’m glad he is dead. . . . Our entire family wants to say how 
glad we are that Bill is no longer on this earth. As far as I’m concerned, 
my brother was lower than the rats in my barn.” Malcolm’s former step-
daughter, now an adult, who was raped repeatedly since her earliest child-
hood, is ecstatic when she receives news of the killing, saying, “Hearing 
the animal is dead is the happiest I’ve ever felt.” While she knows that, as 
one of his victims, she is a suspect in his killing, she insists that she person-
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ally was not involved, saying, “It was none of us [but] I wish it had been 
me who killed him.”11
Police investigators question Malcolm’s former victims and rela-
tives, as well as the people in the neighborhood. They run into a wall of 
silence. The next-door neighbor reports seeing a pair of white males of 
average height and average build leaving the premises after the shooting. 
Although the entire neighborhood seems to have known about Malcolm 
and has been outraged by his living there, the next-door neighbor, whose 
son was killed by a pedophile in 1994, claims not to have known that 
Malcolm had ever sexually abused children. The police are nearly certain 
that the neighbors know who has done the killing and that many of them 
have information that could help in the investigation, yet no one comes 
forward, and those who are interviewed do not provide information.
Months after the murder, investigators are no closer to apprehending 
the killer or killers. It is clear that Malcolm’s murder is a crime that the 
neighborhood does not want solved.
The doctrines of disillusionment, such as those illustrated in chapter 4, 
can spark all manner of classic vigilante action, including acts like the 
killing of William Malcolm. Where the criminal justice system has shown 
itself to be unable or unwilling to do justice and provide protection, a 
vigilante may be inspired to step in and take on that role. Earlier chapters 
are full of such cases.
But the Malcolm case illustrates a new dimension to the vigilante 
impulse: where people act not by taking on the task of doing justice 
themselves but rather by helping to protect the vigilante by refusing to 
help authorities in their efforts to investigate and prosecute the vigilante 
conduct. The community here is essentially serving as an accomplice of the 
vigilante, or at least an accessory after the fact, as the law might call it. They 
are not willing to go into the streets to do the justice, but they are willing to 
take the smaller, less aggressive step of refusing to help authorities, probably 
motivated by the same impulse that provoked the classic vigilante.
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Such vigilante complicity appears in a wide range of forms, some even 
more public and more aggressive than in Malcolm’s case.
AN OUTRAGED COMMUNITY COLLECTIVELY ATTACKS A BULLY  
AND SHIELDS HIS KILLERS
The Killing of Ken McElroy
A resident of Skidmore, Missouri, in the 1980s Ken McElroy is a local 
thief, bully, and sexual predator. He rarely holds a job but always has 
plenty of money from stealing anything he can get a fence to buy. He is an 
active livestock rustler, and as a result, for years Skidmore County has the 
highest incidence of cattle rustling in the state.12
McElroy’s sexual preferences are for young girls between the ages 
of twelve and fifteen. Married three times but never faithful, he attracts 
one young girl after another, keeping them compliant first by attention 
and support in this poor rural area, then by intimidation and abuse. He 
fathers more than twenty children with different girls.13
If family or friends of one of the underage girls objects, McElroy 
responds with an aggressive intimidation campaign. In one instance, a 
twelve-year-old girl in eighth grade is his current target. She soon becomes 
pregnant, drops out of school, and moves in with McElroy. Sixteen days 
after their child is born, she goes home to her parents to escape McElroy’s 
regular beatings. McElroy brings her back at gunpoint and beats her, then 
returns to her parents’ home, shoots their dog, and burns their house to 
the ground. Unsurprisingly, most people are too intimidated to report 
McElroy to the police, and even when they do, little happens, perhaps 
because the police are also afraid of him.14
Whenever McElroy is charged with an offense, he arranges for one 
of his coon-hunting buddies to offer an alibi and works to intimidate any 
witnesses. In one instance, when a neighbor complains of his trespassing, 
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McElroy shoots the man with a shotgun, wounding him. The wounded 
neighbor insists that charges be filed, but between the shooting and the 
trial McElroy parks outside the man’s house to stare at him on nearly 
one hundred occasions. When the trial takes place, it plays out in the 
same way that previous trials have in the past: McElroy is acquitted by an 
intimidated jury after one of his buddies presents the usual false alibi. Free 
to exact revenge, McElroy shows up at the complainant’s farm and shoots 
at him with a rifle as he drives his tractor in a field.
Fig. 8.1. Ken McElroy, killed by the people in his town, 1981. 
(Courtesy of Harry MacLean)
One episode finally brings things to a head. Some of McElroy’s many 
children are accused of stealing from a local grocery store owned by Louis 
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and Bo Bowenkamp. After an argument, McElroy is refused further 
service and is banned from the store. As usual, McElroy engages in an 
aggressive response: he begins a staring vigil outside the store and outside 
the Bowenkamps’ home. Also, as usual, the police refuse to do anything. 
When McElroy twice fires a shotgun at the Bowenkamps’ house, they 
insist on filing a complaint, but nothing is done about it. McElroy returns 
two nights later, firing again, with the same nonaction by authorities.
On July 8, 1980, McElroy confronts Bowenkamp outside his store 
and shoots him with a shotgun, hitting him in the neck. McElroy is 
arrested and charged. Freed while awaiting trial, McElroy continues his 
campaign of intimidation, including threatening a minister and a local 
sheriff who might be witnesses against him.
Despite his usual witnesses, who swear in court that they happened 
to be driving by just at the moment that McElroy shot the elderly man in 
what they testify was self-defense, McElroy is finally convicted of second-
degree assault and sentenced to two years in prison. The town’s citizens 
breathe a collective sigh of relief. Perhaps the McElroy reign of terror is 
finally over.
But McElroy is released on bail pending appeal, and a hearing to con-
sider revoking his bail is delayed repeatedly. When McElroy shows up 
at a local bar ranting that he will kill the Bowenkamps, the townspeople 
arrange a meeting to discuss how to deal with the situation and set up a 
watch to protect the store owners.
McElroy hears of the meeting and drives to a nearby bar, with his wife 
in the passenger seat. He goes inside, buys cigarettes, then climbs back 
into his truck and sits. A group of about forty-five people assemble. He 
starts the truck, then lights a cigarette. Six shots ring out from multiple 
directions, striking and killing McElroy. His young wife is taken from the 
truck to the safety of a nearby bank. The foot of the dead man has fallen 
onto the accelerator, and the engine roars on its way to nowhere.
Amazingly, despite the large group of people present at the time of the 
shooting in broad daylight, no one is able to provide information to inves-
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tigators (with the exception of McElroy’s latest young wife, who was seated 
in the truck at the time of the shooting). A state investigation is followed 
by an FBI investigation ordered by the US Department of Justice. Nearly 
one hundred interviews of apparent witnesses and local residents are con-
ducted, but no one seems willing to provide information to investigators.
Explains Cheryl Huston, whose elderly father had been shot by 
McElroy and who watched the killing of McElroy from her family’s 
grocery store, “We were so bitter and so angry at the law letting us down 
that it came to somebody taking matters in their own hands. . . . No one 
has any idea what a nightmare we lived.” The case remains unsolved.15
This sort of vigilante complicity can include not only refusing to help 
authorities investigate and prosecute but also publicly supporting the vig-
ilantes, as in talking with the news media to explain their motivation and 
to promote their point of view.
COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR GROUP LAWBREAKING  
PROVOKED BY LESS SERIOUS WRONGS
The Destruction of the Venice Pagodas
Venice, a neighborhood in Los Angeles, California, is known for its two-
mile-long promenade along the Pacific Ocean.16 The boardwalk has long 
attracted an eclectic mix of people, including street performers, tourists, 
and sun worshippers. A tourist attraction during the day, it draws a less 
respectable crowd at night. A series of wooden pagodas with benches 
along the boardwalk provide tourists and neighbors with a welcome place 
to sit out of the sun, but at night the same shelters serve as a prime place 
for local gang members to deal drugs. These structures allow dealers to 
hide their drugs in a place nearby so they can control the drugs without 
personally holding them, then signal a confederate to retrieve a certain 
amount once a buyer pays.
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The neighborhood has repeatedly appealed to police to deal with the 
drug problem or at least to remove the pagodas so that the drug dealing 
will move to less prominent places, reducing the extent of the trade, 
but their pleas have no effect. Frustration builds until one local resident 
finally takes matters into his own hands, ramming the structures with his 
pickup truck until they are destroyed. With the pagodas gone, the drug 
dealers move away.
Over the objection of residents, the city rebuilds the seating and 
tables, this time constructed in concrete. The newly installed gathering 
areas are popular with tourists and the local merchants who sell to them, 
but, as expected, the shelters are once again a hit with the drug dealers, 
who now have a nicer location in which to deal drugs at night. As a local 
resident puts it, “Once the picnic tables went back in, it re-created the 
problem.”17 Although local community members regularly call the police 
to report the drug dealing, the police rarely respond because, in their 
view, there are bigger crime problems elsewhere.
Fed up with the lack of police response, local residents decide to again 
take matters into their own hands. One weekend in August 1994, a group 
of residents in ski masks arrives at the site, post a lookout for police, and 
take sledgehammers to the new benches. Organizers have informed the 
neighbors beforehand that the demolition is going to occur so that the 
loud demolition noises will not prompt calls to the police. Apparently, 
someone missed the message and called the police, but the police simply 
ignore the call as being of insufficient importance.
When the sun rises on Monday morning, all of the new structures 
have been destroyed, to the cheers of the large crowd of onlookers. Local 
drug dealers are unhappy with the destruction, and that same morning 
they send their people swarming into the local apartment buildings, 
demanding to know who destroyed their hangouts.
The people who demolished the benches justify their actions by citing 
the refusal of law enforcement to deal with the problem. As one of the 
perpetrators describes the group’s sledgehammer escapade, “We’ve got 
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a bunch of nineteen-year-old kids running this street. The fear is unbe-
lievable. . . . We have the silent approval of the whole community. People 
were cheering—we even had a woman take a few swings.” Another resi-
dent explains, “Sometimes you have to tear the house up to get the rat 
out. We have complained and complained and complained to the police 
and they will not stop here. . . . It was intolerable.” Others who are less 
enthusiastic about the destruction nevertheless concede that “the guys 
who did this may have some legitimate complaints.”18
Fig. 8.2. Venice Beach shelters such as these were destroyed by 
neighbors, 1994. (Courtesy of Nan Palmero, Flickr.com)
Despite the fact that eighty or ninety people witness the demolition 
and that one of the perpetrators is interviewed at the time by the press, 
investigators can find no one willing to help them with their inquiries. As 
one investigator marvels, “It is just amazing to me that there were three 
or four people out there busting up tables and none of the residents saw 
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anything.”19 Because no one in the neighborhood is willing to help, no 
prosecution is ever brought.
This public support for vigilantes is only one of a wide variety of 
ways in which the vigilante impulse can express itself in conduct short of 
classic vigilantism. As will become apparent in the following two chap-
ters, these more covert expressions of the vigilante impulse can be more 
pervasive, more dangerous, and more destructive to justice and effective 
crime control than classic vigilantism ever was or could be.
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THE COMMUNITY AS SHADOW VIGILANTES
A vigilante shoots child abuser William Malcolm in the face, and the neighbors refuse to help authorities investigate. Several vigi-lantes shoot bully Ken McElroy while he is surrounded by a large 
crowd, but none of the many witnesses are willing to identify the shooters 
to investigators. Residents of Venice watch a group of vigilantes spend 
the weekend destroying the seating areas that drug dealers use to ply their 
trade, yet the police must read about the events in the newspaper.
The vigilante impulses that drive some people to take the law into 
their own hands inspire others to act in less visible ways, as with the refusal 
to report an offense or to help investigators. These vigilante sympathizers 
may not be willing to go into the streets themselves, but their subversion 
of effective law enforcement is commonly provoked by the same frustra-
tions with the system that drive classic vigilantes. Rather than becoming 
the punishers themselves, these shadow vigilantes, as discussed in chapter 
3, promote the same goals through a variety of other means by which they 
subvert or distort the criminal justice system.
Imagine that the community members watching the shooting of 
McElroy are sitting on a trial jury for the case. Does anyone doubt what 
the result would be? Or what would be the likely outcome if the killing 
of Malcolm reached a grand jury on which sat people from his neighbor-
hood? The same shadow vigilante impulse that produced their refusal to 
assist investigators is likely to express itself when they are jurors, grand 
jurors, and even voters, or whenever they have an opportunity to affect 
the operation of the criminal justice system.
Consider, for example, the reaction of citizens, in particular jurors, to 
the case of “Subway Vigilante” Bernhard Goetz, discussed in chapter 3. 
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The citizens on that jury refused to convict Goetz in part because they 
viewed his actions as an understandable, if excessive, reaction to the crim-
inal justice system’s failure to provide the safety and justice to which they 
believe citizens are entitled.
Goetz is by no means a unique case but rather is representative of a 
common phenomenon. For example, in a Minot, North Dakota, case, four 
men came to Jeremiah Tallman’s home to confront him about an incident 
from earlier in the day. They exchanged angry words while standing in 
the entryway and were told to leave; they did leave when Tallman cocked 
the slide of his gun. As they walked away, one pounded on a trailer and 
another broke a window. Tallman then shot one of the men in the back 
several times, killing him. He was acquitted of all homicide and assault 
charges.1 He hardly satisfied the legal requirements for self-defense, but 
jurors were particularly accommodating because they saw him as resisting 
aggressors.
Empirical studies show strong support among laypersons for the use 
of defensive force against aggressors and for the excuse of defenders who 
make mistakes in using defensive force. The community views on this point 
are dramatically different from the stated legal rules. Summarizing a series 
of studies, the book Justice, Liability & Blame concludes, “In all of these 
studies, the community judges that these justifications are more compelling 
than the legal codes are willing to grant. Respondents frequently assign no 
liability in cases to which the code attaches liability. Even when respon-
dents assign liability, they typically assign considerably less punishment 
than would be suggested by codes.”2 According to a survey of judges, pros-
ecutors, and defense attorneys, if self-defense is raised at trial, it commonly 
succeeds more often than any other kind of defense. The respondents in 
three major surveys estimated, respectively, that the defense succeeded 76 
percent, 47 percent, and 46 percent of the time.3
In the Goetz case, it was the trial jury that exercised its nullification 
power in support of the vigilante. In other words, the jurors overlooked 
the law and found in favor of Goetz because they considered his subway 
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shootings to be understandable given the rampant crime at the time and 
Goetz’s own previous victimization. But that kind of shadow vigilante 
protection of those who resist wrongdoers can be seen at nearly any point 
in the criminal justice process where citizens are involved.
GRAND JURY RELUCTANCE TO INDICT  
FOR THE UNLAWFUL USE OF DEFENSIVE FORCE
Joe Horn Shoots His Neighbor’s Burglar
On November 14, 2007, Joe Horn is a sixty-one-year-old retiree living 
in Pasadena, Texas.4 He is having a relaxing day when he looks out the 
window and sees two suspicious-looking men approach his next-door 
neighbor’s house. (The two men are Diego Ortiz and Miguel de Jesus, 
and they are intending to rob the neighbor’s house of its cash and jewelry.) 
Horn watches as the two men break into the house, and then he imme-
diately dials 911.
When the operator answers, Horn reports the situation and asks, “I’ve 
got a shotgun; do you want me to stop him?” The dispatcher tells Horn 
to stay in his house, saying, “Ain’t no property worth shooting somebody 
over, OK?” During the call, Horn keeps an eye on his neighbor’s house as 
the burglars are robbing the place, and he repeatedly expresses his frustra-
tion that this type of crime is happening in his neighborhood. After the 
burglars finish stealing cash and jewelry from his neighbor’s home, Horn 
sees them running out the front door. Realizing that they are going to 
escape with his neighbor’s valuables, Horn tells the operator, “I’m gonna 
kill him.” Despite the operator’s repeated pleas to stay in the house, Horn 
picks up his shotgun, loads it, and steps outside the front door. As the 
criminals are running across his lawn, he shouts, “Move, you’re dead,” and 
when the robbers continue to run, he fires three shots and strikes them 
both in the back, killing them.5 Horn runs back into the house and tells 
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the dispatcher what has happened. The police arrive on the scene and find 
the bodies but do not arrest Horn.
Authorities eventually file charges against Horn for murder. In mid-
June 2008 the grand jury convenes in order to hear two weeks of testi-
mony from witnesses, including Horn. On June 30 the jury deliberates and 
decides not to indict Horn. Horn is relieved that he will not have to face 
charges, and there are many community members who feel he acted rightly. 
District Attorney Ken Magidson says, “In Texas, a person has a right to use 
deadly force in certain circumstances to protect property . . . and that’s basi-
cally what the grand jurors had to deal with.” Horn’s attorney, Tom Lam-
bright, says, “Joe is not some sort of wild cowboy. He was trying to help the 
police. He was put in a situation where he didn’t have a choice.”6
The same frustration with the apparent ineffectiveness of the crim-
inal justice system can show itself in shadow vigilante jury nullification 
in any case in which a defendant resists a wrongdoer and is then pros-
ecuted by authorities. This includes not just civilian actors like Goetz but 
also police officers. Consider the jurors’ reaction to the police beating of 
Rodney King.
JURY NULLIFICATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
Acquittal of the Officers Who Beat Rodney King
Los Angeles in the middle to late 1980s is one of the more dangerous 
cities in America. The period from 1984 to 1990 is known in LA as the 
“crack epidemic.” Crack first enters South Central LA in the early 1980s. 
Many children are left to grow up without parents because of addiction. 
Crime steadily rises.7 From 1985 to 1990 the city averages nearly 2.5 
murders, six rapes, and almost ninety robberies every day.8
The heavy demand for crack cocaine also helps local gangs such as the 
Crips and the Bloods to increase their financial strength and recruiting 
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power, which in turn brings an increase in gang violence. Prior to the 
1980s, the gangs have had limited participation in drug trafficking. 
But beginning in 1983, the Los Angeles gangs and their fifty thousand 
members begin to get a stranglehold on the streets, taking control of the 
narcotics industry.9 For citizens, the most dangerous time of day may be 
the early afternoon, when the most dangerous criminals are on the streets: 
armed teenagers just out of school. By 1991 crime in Los Angeles has 
reached its pinnacle. Police officers struggle more than ever to control the 
streets. Murder and violent crime rates reach all-time highs.
On the night of March 2, 1991, Rodney King watches a basketball 
game with friends while drinking quite a bit of alcohol in suburban Los 
Angeles.10 When the game ends, King and his two friends decide to take 
the 210 Freeway into downtown LA to try and meet some girls. King 
drives a bit erratically, probably because his blood alcohol level is 0.19, 
well above the legal limit, and he has been smoking marijuana. California 
Highway Patrol (CHP) officers notice King’s speeding and reckless 
driving and begin to follow him. King, who is on probation for a robbery 
offense, does not want to go back to prison. He hits the gas and increases 
his speed to 115 mph. With the CHP right behind him, the high-speed 
pursuit heads down the freeway.
When his vehicle is cornered, King finally stops; his two friends 
quickly exit the vehicle and surrender to police. King takes a more com-
bative approach. He refuses to exit the vehicle. When he does finally exit, 
he begins waving at the police helicopter that is overhead. Police backup 
arrive in the form of three LAPD squad cars: Officers Laurence Powell 
and Timothy Wind in one car, Theodore Briseno and Rolando Solano in 
the second car, and Sgt. Stacey Koon in the third.
King’s erratic, even bizarre, behavior leads the officers to believe King 
is on PCP (or angel dust), a drug commonly associated with violence. 
King grabs his buttocks in a manner that a CHP officer believes indicates 
that King is reaching for a weapon, so she immediately draws her gun and 
asks him to get on the ground. Sergeant Koon, who knows that the threat 
Shadow Vigilantes.indd   163 12/5/17   11:33 AM
S H A D O W  V I G I L A N T E S
164
of violence from all parties is escalated with the presence of a gun, orders 
guns to be holstered. He also orders his four officers to perform a tactical 
“swarm” technique to subdue King without the use of weapons.
Right around the time that the physical struggle between the LAPD 
officers and King begins, George Holliday, the manager of a plumbing 
company, begins videotaping the interaction from his apartment ninety 
feet away. After the struggle begins and after it is clear to officers that King 
is resisting arrest, they fire their TASER gun twice at King, but the pow-
erful voltage does not subdue him. He continues to wrestle, gets back up 
off the ground, and rushes toward the officers. Police officers start using 
“power strokes” against King’s limbs with their batons to subdue him, 
but still King continues to struggle and stand back up. Koon orders his 
officers to “hit his joints, hit the wrists, hit his elbows, hit his knees, hit 
his ankles.”11 Ultimately, the LAPD inflicts nearly fifty blows and several 
kicks on King before dragging him on his stomach to the side of the 
road to wait for paramedics to arrive. King’s medical examination reveals 
numerous injuries, including a fractured facial bone, a broken right ankle, 
and multiple bruises and lacerations.12
The incident receives almost no publicity until Holliday releases his 
eighty-one-second videotape to a local news station two days later. CNN 
picks up the story, and it spreads like wildfire across the nation. The video 
sparks outrage among many who see it as yet another example of police 
brutality against a minority group. An LA poll taken soon after the tape’s 
release indicates that 92 percent of participants think authorities used 
excessive force.13
Two weeks after the incident, a grand jury indicts four officers—
Powell, Wind, Briseno, and Koon—for use of excessive force. Due to the 
publicity surrounding the case, in July the California Court of Appeals 
unanimously grants the defense’s motion for a change of venue while also 
removing the original judge because of evidence of his bias toward the 
prosecution. In November a new judge decides to try the case in Simi 
Valley, a conservative and predominantly white city that starkly contrasts 
Shadow Vigilantes.indd   164 12/5/17   11:33 AM
T H E  C O M M U N I T Y  A S  S H A D O W  V I G I L A N T E S
165
with the makeup of Los Angeles. Nearly a year after the incident, on 
March 5, 1992, a jury consisting of ten whites, one Asian, and one Latino 
hear opening arguments from the prosecution, arguing that the use of 
force was excessive.
Seven weeks of testimony are presented (Rodney King never testi-
fied). The jury studies the eighty-one-second Holliday videotape. When 
it is all over, the jury votes to acquit.
Jurors report that they only needed one day to decide to acquit the 
officers of the main charges against them. However, they needed an addi-
tional six days because they remained deadlocked on the assault charge 
against Powell.
Many experts believe that race played a role in the jury’s decision, but 
many of the jurors dismiss that notion. One juror points out the obvious, 
that the two other men in the car, both of whom are black, calmly surren-
dered and had no force used against them.14 One female juror notes, “In 
my opinion, based on all of the evidence that was presented to us, it is not 
a racial thing. I am not unhappy with the verdict; that’s the only verdict 
that could have been reached.”15
The juror’s statement suggests that, given the violent conditions in LA 
at the time, the jury was not afraid to give police officers some flexibility in 
their use of force. Jurors seemed to be giving police more power in policing 
the streets than the state’s law would allow. Stanford constitutional law pro-
fessor Gerald Gunther notes, “This jury seemed unwilling to put any decent 
limits on police discretion, and I think that’s the flat-out bottom line on 
this. The beating that King took was not justified even on the assumption 
that he did not turn quiescent as soon as [police] stopped the car and even 
if they had a basis for using force in the first few blows.”16 Some believe the 
majority of the jurors had such a “reverence for police officers as guardians 
of the social order” that the prosecution’s use of the shocking videotape may 
have unintentionally undermined its own case.17 Some of the jurors may 
well have thought that the police conduct was in violation of existing law. 
And yet, they may have felt that the right thing to do was to acquit the offi-
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cers because the jurors were concerned that existing law did not take proper 
account of the need for the force nor did it give enough room for an under-
standable mistake in a fast-moving situation.18
This broad leeway given to police officers is reflected in the data. According 
to a Cato Institute study, the prosecution, imprisonment, and other sanc-
tions of police officers occur at a much lower rate than for civilians facing 
similar charges.19 In some cases, according to the Cato data, officers are 
acquitted even in the face of clear evidence such as multiple witnesses or 
videotape. For example, in September 2009 a Spokane, Washington, jury 
acquitted an officer of assault for kicking a suspect in the face, though 
other officers present confirmed that he had done so.20 In another Wash-
ington State incident in 2010, an officer was acquitted after he was vid-
eotaped striking a fifteen-year-old girl who, when told to remove her bas-
ketball shoes, kicked toward the officer’s fellow deputy.21 The first trial 
resulted in a hung jury, while the second resulted in an acquittal.
Of course, if a case takes on a racial component—as when a white 
officer is perceived as using excessive force against a black citizen—racial 
political influences can conflict with the normal sympathy for an officer’s 
mistake, as what occurred to some extent in the Rodney King case. On 
the other hand, even though the Black Lives Matter movement has done 
much to sensitize the public, the police officers involved even in cases that 
make the headlines are rarely punished. Grand juries refused to indict 
the officers in the killings of Eric Garner (2014), Michael Brown (2015), 
and Tamir Rice (2015). None of the officers involved in the killings of 
Freddie Gray (2016), Terrance Cruther (2016), Sylville Smith (2017), 
Samuel DuBose (2017), or Philando Castile (2017) were found guilty 
at trial. (Similarly, neighborhood watch supervisor George Zimmerman 
was acquitted at trial for his 2012 killing of Trayvon Martin.)22
Empirical studies confirm these public views: many people tend to be 
quite forgiving of mistakes made when force is used for law enforcement 
purposes, certainly much more forgiving than the criminal code itself, 
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and this even applies to citizens when acting in a law enforcement role. 
As one study concludes,
In general, the subjects are much more forgiving than the Code of a 
person’s mistakes in using deadly force to affect a citizen’s arrest. The 
Code imposes murder liability if the apprehending person kills an 
innocent person. A strong majority of the subjects, in contrast, impose 
no punishment even in the case in which the citizen kills an innocent 
person in trying to stop a fleeing rapist. Only in the case in which an 
innocent person is killed in an attempt to stop an offender fleeing from 
a property damage offense does a bare majority of our subjects judge 
punishment to be appropriate and, even then, liability is a few months 
rather than the murder liability that the Code provides.23
These striking results help explain why it is so easy for citizens, disil-
lusioned with the justice failures of their criminal justice system, to justify 
expressing their shadow vigilante impulse through protecting those who 
use force against wrongdoers.
FRUSTRATION WITH CRIMINAL JUSTICE FAILURES  
AS GIVING RISE TO PRIVATE POLICING
Shadow vigilantism among citizens also shows itself in the loss of confidence 
in and reduced expectations of official law enforcement, which has produced 
the dramatic rise in private security and neighborhood watch organizations. 
The 2000 National Crime Prevention Survey estimated that 41 percent of the 
American population lives in communities covered by neighborhood watch. 
The survey report concludes that “this makes Neighborhood Watch the 
largest single organized crime-prevention activity in the nation.”24 One writer 
describes the degree to which private entities have taken over law enforcement 
functions in this country: “Private security officers vastly outnumber public law 
enforcement officers, and spending on private security is approximately double 
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the spending for public law enforcement. For the most part, this growth has 
all occurred within the past three or four decades—only thirty-five years ago, 
there were more public police officers than private security guards.”25
Watch groups are not formed in neighborhoods that are content with 
their law enforcement situation. Neighborhood watch is a literal form of 
a neighborhood taking on the law enforcement role of the government.26
But as chapter 7 made clear, shifting the law enforcement function 
to citizens commonly creates serious problems. Recall, for example, the 
members of the Ranch Rescue group who used improper detention 
methods because they lacked the formal training that police receive. In 
the case of the Crown Heights Maccabees, their vigilance was effective 
but tended to push crime into surrounding areas rather than preventing 
it. Project Perverted Justice, in which an unofficial group stepped in to 
take on a role traditionally reserved for police detectives, had the effect of 
inspiring others with more extreme views to take on a similar role. Society 
would be better off if official law enforcement did its job and did not 
provoke the shadow vigilante impulse that leads to citizen enforcement.
These same difficulties that we saw in the earlier cases can occur in any 
situation in which citizens take on the law enforcement role, including 
neighborhood watch. As noted above, George Zimmerman was the neigh-
borhood watch coordinator for his gated community in Sanford, Florida, 
in 2012 when he shot Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year-old African Amer-
ican high school student who was temporarily staying with a family who 
lived in the gated community.27 (Zimmerman apparently approached 
Martin about his presence in the area, and the contact grew into a con-
frontation in which Zimmerman ended up fatally shooting the unarmed 
Martin.) It seems unlikely that such a confrontation would have occurred if 
that community relied upon official rather than private policing.
The local police chief concluded that Zimmerman had a right to act in 
self-defense and released him. A public national uproar led to the appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor, who charged Zimmerman with second-
degree murder, but on July 13, 2013, the jury acquitted Zimmerman.
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Fig. 9.1. Painting of George Zimmerman, neighborhood watch 
volunteer who shot Trayvon Martin, 2012. (Courtesy of DonkeyHotey, 
Flickr.com)
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Another danger of leaving neighborhoods to fend for themselves is 
that their enthusiasm and newfound authority may lead to dropping any 
pretense of approximating professional police conduct. Some neighbor-
hoods have gone beyond the formation of watch groups. One develop-
ment is the “Glock Block,” where neighborhoods in Oregon, Texas, and 
Arizona advertise “We Don’t Call the Police.”28
POLITICIANS PROPOSE LAW-AND-ORDER LEGISLATION  
TO COMBAT PERCEIVED FAILURES OF JUSTICE
But the shadow vigilante’s frustration with a criminal justice system 
that is seen as indifferent to the importance of doing justice plays itself 
out in much broader civic conduct as well. It means that politicians are 
provoked to support changes in criminal law and criminal adjudication 
that are designed to force liability and punishment from an apparently 
reluctant criminal justice system—even when the reform also risks doing 
injustice. Consider several examples of this dynamic that have had a sig-
nificant effect on the American system.
The Abduction and Murder of Polly Klaas
In 1993 twelve-year-old Polly Klaas lives with her mother and sister in 
Petaluma, California, a small median-income town a few miles north of 
San Francisco.29 She is a shy girl who is much beloved by her family and 
friends. Her favorite subjects at school are music and theater.
On Friday, October 1, 1993, Polly invites her two best friends over 
for a slumber party. The girls, who are all clarinet players, have formed 
their friendship in the Petaluma Junior High School band. Because it is 
a weekend, they are allowed to stay up late talking and playing games. As 
the girls begin to get tired, Polly starts to leave her bedroom to fetch the 
sleeping bags from the living room. When she opens the bedroom door 
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she is shocked to find a man standing there with a knife. He immediately 
threatens all three girls: if they make any noise, he will cut their throats.
Polly offers the man a box with her savings in it, fifty dollars in total, 
which he refuses. He tells the girls to lie on the floor and then proceeds to 
tie their hands behind their backs and place pillowcases over their heads. 
He then grabs Polly and flees. The two girls immediately work to free 
themselves, stepping through their tied arms, and run to Polly’s mother. 
By 11:00 p.m. the search has begun for Polly Klaas.
The next day the community rallies behind the search efforts. Citi-
zens form patrols that scour the forests surrounding the town. Thou-
sands of posters of Polly are printed and displayed. Purple ribbons, Polly’s 
favorite color, are put up all over town.
The search gains national attention as popular television shows, 
including America’s Most Wanted and 20/20, feature segments about the 
kidnapping. Hollywood actress Winona Ryder, a native of Petaluma, 
offers a $200,000 reward for information leading to the discovery of Polly. 
She tells America’s Most Wanted that she is offering the reward “because 
this happened in the community I was raised in.”30
On November 28, almost two months after Polly was taken, a local res-
ident is hiking around her property with friends when they stumble across 
disturbing items scattered around several bushes: girl’s clothing, a condom 
wrapper, binding tape, and rags with knots in them. Fearing that these items 
may be related to Polly’s abduction, the resident calls the police.
The police link the evidence to Richard Allen Davis. On November 
30 Davis is arrested but refuses to talk about Polly. However on Saturday, 
December 4, he confesses to kidnapping Polly and murdering her, and he 
tells investigators where they can find her body. In the weeks since her 
abduction, Polly’s family has kept a candle burning in her window. They 
now extinguish it.
Davis has served time on several occasions for robbery, burglary, 
rape, assault, and kidnapping. He was released early on parole twice, only 
to quickly reoffend. After his first parole he kidnapped a woman, sexu-
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ally assaulted her, was arrested, escaped from prison, kidnapped another 
woman, and was rearrested after breaking into yet another woman’s 
home.31 He goes to prison for that laundry list of offenses but six years 
later is again paroled. When released, he and a criminal partner force 
their way into a woman’s home, threaten to kill her family, beat her, and 
force her to go to the bank and withdraw $6,000. When that money runs 
out a few months later, they rob a bank.
In 1985 Davis is arrested again, convicted, and sentenced to sixteen 
years. But on June 27, 1993, he is paroled again after serving half of his 
sentence. In October of the same year he is standing in Polly’s bedroom 
with a knife. Had he been required to serve his entire prison sentence, 
Polly Klaas would not have been within his grasp.32 Davis was arrested 
over fourteen times and convicted of many violent offenses before he kid-
napped and murdered Polly Klaas.33
Almost overnight, support builds for the passage of “three strikes 
and you’re out” legislation, spearheaded by Michael Reynolds, whose 
daughter had been violently killed by a just-paroled repeat offender.34
On November 8, 1994, California Proposition 184, the Three Strikes 
Initiative, is on the ballot and receives an overwhelming majority with 
almost 72 percent support.35 Outrage over the Polly Klaas case is credited 
with inspiring that support. The new law has mandatory harsh sentences 
for repeat offenders: “If a criminal has had one previous serious or violent 
felony conviction, the mandatory sentence for a second such conviction 
is doubled. After two violent or serious felony convictions, any further 
felony, non-violent or not, will trigger a third strike.” The mandatory sen-
tence is then even longer, typically three times the ordinary sentence, or 
twenty-five years.36 (Prior to the bill, judges could factor in previous con-
victions in imposing longer sentences for repeat offenders, but doing so 
was not mandatory and was at the discretion of the judge.)
Within two years of Polly’s death, twenty-two states followed California’s 
lead in enacting a version of the three strikes legislation. In 1994, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, 
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North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin passed their respective 
laws. The next year Arkansas, Florida, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont followed suit.37 
When Massachusetts enacted its version of the three strikes law in 2012, it 
became the twenty-eighth state to have some form of the law.38
POLITICIANS PROMOTE MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Beyond the three strikes legislation, politicians have promoted manda-
tory minimum sentences of all kinds. It is common for criminal statutes 
to specify a maximum authorized sentence for an offense, but it became 
politically popular to also provide a minimum sentence. This trend derives 
not from a single headline-making case like that of Polly Klaas but rather 
from a stream of what was perceived as outrageously lenient sentences—
much like the dozen or so described in chapter 4 and the appendix, such as 
the sentence to probation and community service for the shopkeeper who 
shot a teenage girl in the back after wrongly accusing her of shoplifting and 
the sentence of a fine for the two racist men who hunted down their victim 
after a confrontation in a bar and beat him to death with a baseball bat.
Dissatisfaction with overly forgiving judges who were given broad 
discretion nurtured the mandatory minimum movement that took hold 
during the 1970s, initially in New York when drug and crime rates were 
rising.39 Once begun, the movement took on substantial momentum. 
From 1991 to 2011 the number of mandatory minimum penalties in 
federal criminal law nearly doubled.40 More than two-thirds of the states 
have mandatory minimums for drug offenses.41 More than 80 percent of 
the increase in the prison population between 1985 and 1995 was due to 
drug convictions that triggered mandatory minimum sentences.42
Unfortunately, the shift to mandatory minimums essentially guaran-
tees a regular stream of unjust sentences, some grossly so. Every offense or 
offender presents its own unique situation. A just sentence requires taking 
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into account the seriousness of the offense, as well as the culpability and 
capacities of the offender. Because of the wide differences among cases, 
any mandatory minimum will impose an excessive sentence in some cases.
Research studies demonstrate the point. One study of laypersons’ 
shared expectations of justice showed the dramatic conflict between the 
law’s application of mandatory minimums in real cases and the average 
person’s judgments about those cases. In one three strikes case, test sub-
jects gave an offender 3.1 years; in reality, the court was required to give 
life imprisonment. In a cocaine case, subjects gave 4.2 years, while the 
court was obliged to give life without parole. In a marijuana case, the sub-
jects gave 1.9 years, while the court was compelled to give fifteen years 
to life.43 The unfortunate irony here is that these cases are seen as grossly 
unjust even by the lay public who elected the politicians who put the 
mandatory minimum sentencing rules in place.44
To illustrate how badly wrong the system can go with mandatory 
minimums generally and three strikes statutes in particular, consider the 
case of Shane Taylor.
Twenty-Five Years to Life for  
Possessing Drugs Worth Ten Dollars
At age eleven, Shane Taylor is living on the streets of Los Angeles.45 He 
had previously been bouncing around from house to house, often staying 
with friends and relatives. After a few years on the streets, he develops 
a methamphetamine addiction, initially out of curiosity and as a respite 
from his otherwise bleak life.
Around age sixteen he meets Shelly Hayes. The two begin dating and 
before long have fallen in love. Hayes sees the good in Taylor. Taylor in 
turn appreciates that Hayes does not use drugs and is trying to make a life 
for herself by going to night school. Taylor is drawn to that positive path. 
However, in 1988 he is arrested for two burglaries that he committed to 
feed his drug addiction and spends time in prison. Neither of the burglar-
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ized homes was occupied, and Taylor took something from only one of the 
houses. He serves his time in prison and says he “learned [his] lesson.”46 
After his release, he marries Hayes, and the two begin their life together.
When Hayes tells Taylor that she is pregnant, he is overwhelmed 
with joy. He is certain that he wants to be a good father and to get his life 
together. He starts working full-time as a prep cook, earning money to 
support his family. His daughter, Alisha, is born into a loving home, and 
Taylor has never been happier. He holds a steady job, is a good husband 
and father, and together he and Hayes strive to raise their daughter.
In 1996 Taylor and Hayes’s brother take a small retreat together as 
a break from their normal hardworking lives. They drive up toward the 
Sequoia National Park, where they find a scenic overlook, pull over, turn 
on the car radio, and open a few beers. A police officer driving past also 
decides to pull over and see if either of the young men is underage. Unfor-
tunately, Taylor has not quite managed to completely give up meth. The 
police officer finds 0.14 grams of the drug in a plastic bag tucked into Tay-
lor’s wallet. The drugs have a street value of under ten dollars.
Taylor is convicted of illegal narcotics possession. When he shows up 
for sentencing a month later, Judge Howard Broadman is surprised to see 
him: “I never expected to see you again, frankly. I thought a lot about you. 
And I said, ‘Jeez, if I were him, I’d do research and find out what country 
didn’t have extradition laws,’ because I don’t think I’d have showed back 
up.”47 Taylor has done what the law requires of him and is hoping to get a 
sentence of a year or two and treatment for his drug problem. To his shock 
and horror and that of his family, Taylor is sentenced to twenty-five years 
to life for his ten dollars’ worth of drugs. Because of his burglary and the 
attempted burglary more than eight years ago, the minor possession offense 
becomes his third strike and requires a mandatory minimum sentence.
Hayes is forced to raise their four-year-old daughter by herself, as Taylor 
is locked up for the foreseeable future for carrying that meth in his wallet. 
Years later the judge who was compelled to sentence him attempted, with 
the help of a private group, to get Taylor’s sentence reduced.48
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This outcome has been the case for thousands of defendants in Cal-
ifornia and other states that enacted similar—three strikes or repeat—
offender legislation. Lester Wallace was a homeless man suffering from 
schizophrenia who had two nonviolent residential burglaries on his 
record. When police caught him attempting to steal a car radio, he 
became an early victim of the three strikes legislation in California, having 
committed his crime hours after the legislation came into effect. He was 
sentenced to twenty-five years to life. Curtis Wilkerson was sentenced 
to twenty-five years to life for shoplifting; his first two strikes arose from 
some group criminal activities he participated in more than thirteen years 
before. The property he was trying to steal was a $2.50 pair of white tube 
socks.49 Under many three strikes statutes, petty offenders are being incar-
cerated for long prison terms.50
Everyone—offenders and the public alike—would have been better off if 
this sentencing war had never begun, if the system had restrained overly 
lenient sentencing, perhaps with sentencing guidelines, and had never 
sparked the shadow vigilante impulse of voter outrage over such leniency 
that gave us three strikes statutes and mandatory minimums.51
The problem is we now have mandatory minimums, and, as unneces-
sary as they may be, getting rid of them will not be easy because politi-
cians will worry that voting to repeal them will mark the politicians as 
being “soft on crime” during the next election.
We will for some time pay the price for our past sins of enacting rules 
and practices that produce predictable failures of justice, advertising the 
system’s seeming indifference to doing justice. At the very least, we can 
stop making things worse and begin to repair the system’s moral cred-
ibility by having the system publicly and persuasively commit itself to the 
importance of doing justice and to forsake trading justice away unneces-
sarily or for a less important benefit.
The effect of justice-frustrating sentencing in sparking the shadow 
vigilante impulse that stoked politicians’ calls for three strikes and man-
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datory minimums can be seen in other contexts as well, in which injus-
tice-producing legislation suddenly becomes popular. Consider other 
examples with similar dynamics.
POLITICIANS PROMOTE REDUCING THE AGE TO BE TRIED AS AN ADULT
Multiple Robber-Murderer Gets Five Years of Rehabilitation
Willie Bosket is a troubled child.52 In third grade, he is “having problems 
in school like pulling fire alarms and fighting with the students and the 
teachers and stealing school books and materials like colored paper.”53 In 
1974, after several run-ins with the law, a judge sends him to Brookwood 
Center for Boys. He sneaks out to get drunk, skips classes, hits another 
boy in the eye with a poker, rapes another boy in the shower, steals ciga-
rettes from a vending machine, and drives a truck into a social worker. 
After being released to a group home in Brooklyn, he quickly runs away, 
back to his home neighborhood of Harlem.
On a cold spring morning in 1978, Bosket, now around fourteen 
years old, lifts $380 from a sleeping subway passenger. With that cash, he 
buys himself a .22-caliber handgun with a holster he can strap to his leg. 
On Sunday, March 19, 1978, Bosket is again riding the subway, looking 
for an easy victim to rob. In the late afternoon, around 5:30 p.m., he spots 
a passenger sleeping. Waiting until they are alone in the car, he nudges the 
man, Noel Perez, to see if he will wake easily. When there is no response, 
Bosket starts to remove the watch from the man’s wrist. Suddenly the pas-
senger wakes up, startling Bosket, who draws his gun and shoots him in 
the head twice. As blood pools around the body, Bosket grabs the watch, 
some money, and a gold ring. Instead of feeling remorse about taking the 
man’s life, Bosket brags about what he has done to his sister, apparently 
emboldened by the fact that he has gotten away with murder. With no 
witnesses, the police are unable to identify the killer of Perez.
Shadow Vigilantes.indd   177 12/5/17   11:33 AM
S H A D O W  V I G I L A N T E S
178
Later that same week, on Thursday, March 23, Bosket, with his gun 
strapped to his leg and his seventeen-year-old cousin Herman by his side, 
sets out to make some money. Having had recent success robbing subway 
passengers, they head to the closest subway station in Harlem: 148th 
Street and Lexington Avenue. As they wait for the next train to arrive, 
they notice a yard worker, Anthony Lamorte, connecting cars to waiting 
trains. He is carrying a handheld CB radio that is worth quite a bit of 
money. As they approach Lamorte, he turns to face them and tells them 
to “get the hell out,” since the area is a restricted zone for workers only. 
When the youths taunt Lamorte, telling him to “come down here and 
make us get out,” he moves toward them.54 Bosket pulls out his gun and 
demands the CB radio. As Lamorte turns to run, Bosket fires, hitting him 
in the right shoulder. Lamorte is able to reach safety and call for help, 
while the two young men flee.
This failed robbery does not deter Bosket and Herman. Over the next 
few days, they continue to rob subway passengers at gunpoint. From one man 
they get twelve dollars after they kick him down the stairs. Another man is 
shot in the hip when he resists their demands. Bosket is apprehended for 
shooting the man in the hip but released. With a murder and several violent 
assaults under his belt and no punishment, Bosket feels invulnerable.
On Monday, March 27, just over a week after his first killing, Bosket 
and his cousin once again go to the subway station. The car they enter is 
empty except for one passenger. As the train leaves the station, Bosket 
pulls out his gun and threatens the passenger, demanding all of his money. 
When the man tells them he does not have any cash, Bosket kills him. 
Going through the man’s pockets, Bosket finds two dollars.
Worried, the NYPD turns its full attention to investigating the 
subway killings. When Bosket sees a front-page newspaper article about 
the killings, he proudly shows it to his sister. The police eventually pick 
up Bosket and his cousin for questioning. They get the cousin to turn on 
Bosket in return for lenient treatment and charge Bosket with two counts 
of murder and one count of attempted murder.
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Bosket, who is still not old enough to drive a car, has been in and 
out of the New York juvenile courts his entire life and knows that as a 
juvenile he is mostly protected from punishment. While being detained 
awaiting the hearing, he stabs another boy with a fork, hits a counselor in 
the face, and chokes a psychiatrist. The judge is shocked by his belligerent 
behavior. Despite all this, when Bosket pleads guilty to the two counts of 
murder and one count of attempted murder, he receives a sentence of five 
years’ placement in the Division for Youth, the maximum allowed under 
current law for a juvenile. The focus for juvenile offenders is rehabilita-
tion. Facing similar charges, an adult could have been sentenced to fifteen 
years to life.
Politicians are outraged. Reports of the subway killer’s violent esca-
pades throughout the media have scared people, and many are shocked to 
see the perpetrator receive so light a sentence, especially since rehabilitation 
does not seem to work for this repeat offender. Mayor Ed Koch calls Bosket 
a “mad-dog” murderer and complains that “it’s an outrage that in this town 
you can kill, you can murder and you can do it a second time and not get the 
death penalty.”55 New York governor Hugh Carey tells reporters, “There 
was a breakdown of the system, and it is really on the doorstep of the Divi-
sion for Youth. The blame is squarely on the shoulders of the department.”56 
After stating that “this type of offender should never be allowed back on the 
streets,” he calls legislators to Albany for a special session, during which they 
will radically revise the juvenile justice system.57
The Juvenile Offender Act of 1978 is passed just a month after Willie 
Bosket receives his five-year placement.58 The act changes the New York 
criminal justice system’s treatment of juveniles; it becomes the harshest in the 
country and shifts the principle of punishment away from rehabilitation to a 
focus strictly on protecting society. The new laws make fourteen- and fifteen-
year-olds equally criminally responsible as adults for fourteen listed crimes 
and makes even thirteen-year-olds criminally responsible for murder.59
The defense of immaturity is no longer available for these crimes 
(which include kidnapping, manslaughter, arson, and burglary); a juve-
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nile will face the same punishment as an adult in the same situation.60 
The act, known as the Willie Bosket Law, becomes a benchmark for other 
states in dealing with young offenders.
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s the number of homicides 
committed by juveniles has climbed steadily all over the country. By the 
late 1990s it has stopped increasing but still remains a major issue, espe-
cially in cities.61 During that time, many other states follow New York 
in lowering the age at which children can be tried as adults in criminal 
court.62 Most states allow prosecution in adult court of juveniles who are 
sixteen years old or younger for some offense.63
While one can easily understand the frustration over the criminal 
justice system’s failures in cases like that of Willie Bosket, the reaction 
again is to support legislation that goes too far and that now guarantees 
a regular stream of injustices, as the system is now required to ignore the 
immaturity of many offenders who deserve mitigation or excuse. To illus-
trate the point, consider the case of Shimeek Gridine.
Seventy-Year Sentence for a Fourteen-Year-Old’s First Offense
Shimeek Gridine, growing up in northern Florida, plays Pop Warner foot-
ball and dreams of being a merchant seaman when he grows up, excited by 
the stories he heard of his grandfather who had chosen that career path.64 
Gridine works hard in school and achieves good grades. At age thirteen, 
his mother loses her job. Because money is tight they move to Jacksonville 
to live with his grandparents.
After school on April 21, 2009, Gridine, now fourteen, and his 
younger friend, twelve, go to the local barbershop to hang out. Gridine is 
going through an emotionally hard time, since two family members died 
in the previous weeks.
As they leave the barbershop, they notice a strange-shaped item lying 
under a parked car. They crouch down to investigate and realize it is a 
small shotgun. They pull it out, both thrilled and scared at their new dis-
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covery. Just then they see a man across the alley taking the trash out of a 
restaurant. Thinking he is the owner, these two boys approach him with 
the gun and demand that he give them all the money he has.
Unamused and seemingly unafraid of the young boys, the man refuses 
their demands and turns to walk back into the restaurant. As he does this 
Gridine fires the gun, pelting the man’s back, shoulder, and neck with tiny 
pellets. The two boys quickly run away, scared. The man is taken to the 
hospital and released that same day.
Gridine and his friend return to their homes and try to act as if nothing 
had happened. The police investigate, and the boys become nervous and 
agitated. Gridine tells his grandfather what he has done. Feeling very bad 
about it, Gridine goes to the Jacksonville Sherriff ’s Office with his grand-
father and turns himself in.
Because he is only fourteen and has no history of violence, Gridine 
is hopeful that the judge will be lenient. He is charged with first-degree 
attempted murder, attempted armed robbery, and aggravated battery. 
Gridine is charged as an adult even though he is only fourteen. He pleads 
guilty to armed robbery on the advice of his lawyer, who is confident that 
he will get a much lesser sentence by doing so. Gridine elects to be tried 
before the judge rather than with a jury on the other charges.
Family members from as far away as New York come down to Florida 
for the trial to speak on behalf of the boy and to show their support. 
However, all of this support seems to have a negative effect on the judge, as 
he declares, “Because you were known to be a good kid, because you have 
good grades and a good family that loves you, you knew better. Therefore, 
for the first charge of Premeditated Attempted Murder, I sentence you to 
70 years in prison. On the second charge of Armed Robbery, I sentence 
you to 25 years. You will serve the sentences together.”65 The sentence is 
thirty years longer than the sentence the prosecution had asked for.
The seventy-year sentence is essentially a life sentence. As Gridine’s 
public defender points out, it extends beyond the life expectancy for an 
American male. A life sentence for a fourteen-year-old seems to take away 
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the possibility for the youth to “demonstrate growth and maturity” and 
instead is a decision to simply let him rot in adult prison.66
Unfortunately, Gridine’s situation is not unique. Since the wave of 
harsher penalties against juveniles swept the nation, hundreds of children 
have found themselves tried in adult court and sentenced to long prison 
terms. These are not all hardened repeat offenders like Willie Bosket. 
For many, it was their first offense and an act of impulsiveness. In one 
case, a thirteen-year-old boy who was raised by an alcoholic and cocaine-
addicted father who frequently watched pornography in the home went 
to his neighbor’s house and raped the twenty-three-year-old mother. A 
psychologist found that the youth had “underlying neurological prob-
lems that made him more impulsive than other juveniles his age.”67 He 
was given a sentence of life plus twenty years.68 In Nevada another thir-
teen-year-old was sentenced to life without parole after pleading guilty to 
killing the man who had been sexually molesting him.69 A twelve-year-old 
boy in South Carolina was sentenced to sixty years in prison for killing his 
grandparents after they beat him and locked him in his room.70
Outrage over the system’s failure to restrain vicious sixteen-year-
old repeat offender Willie Bosket led to distorting the criminal justice 
system so that it now gives essentially life imprisonment to immature first 
offenders like fourteen-year-old Shimeek Gridine. Young offenders and 
the public would have been better off if the system had initially taken 
more seriously its obligation to punish and to protect so that a Willie 
Bosket case would never have happened.
The best way to avoid the destructive effects of shadow vigilantism is 
for the criminal justice system to publicly commit itself to the importance 
of doing justice—giving offenders the punishment they deserve, no more 
and no less. With that, the system can earn back its moral credibility with 
the community and can avoid the downward spiral of shadow vigilantism 
and its distorting effects.
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE OFFICIALS AS SHADOW VIGILANTES
Chapter 3 discussed the practice of “testilying” in which police officers feel morally justified in lying in court about the circum-stances of a search or seizure because they see the exclusionary 
rule (which disallows use of even the most reliable evidence if a court 
determines that the search rules are violated) as an immoral undermining 
of society’s obligation to fight crime and do justice. Also discussed there 
was the case of sexual psychopath Bill Bradford during which police 
played fast and loose with the court’s warrant rules because they saw no 
other way of effectively stopping this multiple murderer.
These two examples are symptomatic of the larger problem: officials 
in many if not most parts of the criminal justice system see the system’s 
apparent indifference to failures of justice as a moral justification for 
manipulating or perverting the system as needed to catch offenders and 
have them receive the punishment they deserve. Below is another example 
of subverting the search and seizure rules, followed by examples of other 
kinds of shadow vigilante subversions in other parts of the system.
EXCEEDING SEARCH AND SEIZURE RULES AND TESTILYING ABOUT IT  
TO SUBVERT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In the Columbia Heights section of Washington, DC, on the evening of 
November 1, 1969, five-year-old Penny Sellers and her older sister Denise 
visit the apartment of their grandfather Robert Dennis. Also present 
there is a neighbor, William Sheard, who gives the girls candy and lets 
them play with his puppy, as he has done in the past. Around 9:30 p.m. 
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the girls have moved on to watch television in the basement apartment of 
a friend. Penny leaves to go back to Sheard’s apartment to play with his 
puppy again. It is the last time her family ever sees her.
After about an hour, Penny’s grandfather asks Sheard if he knows 
where Penny is and is told that she “had gone up the street with a man.” 
At the grandfather’s request, Sheard calls the police. The police arrive 
at about 11:00 p.m., having been advised to contact “a Sheard.”1 Upon 
meeting Sheard, officers are informed by him that a child is missing, that 
he has telephoned the police, and that he had been the last person to 
see the child. One hour later, police find Penny’s body amid debris on 
the floor of a garage near the apartment building. Penny’s genital area 
is exposed and bloody. A later autopsy reveals that she has been raped, 
and died due to asphyxiation from suffocation. Police also find her under-
pants in the alley near the garage and one of her shoes on the back porch 
of the house next door.
The police chief orders a lockdown of the apartment complex and for 
all male residents to be questioned. During the questioning, officers are 
to also make a visual search for blood in the open living areas of the men’s 
apartments. Officers Shuler and Jones are assigned to question Sheard in 
his apartment, since he is apparently the last person to see Penny alive.
Officer Shuler knocks on the door and identifies himself as a police 
officer. When Sheard answers the door, the officers immediately become 
suspicious because Sheard has fresh scratches on his face, looks as though 
he has just taken a bath, is wearing fresh but heavily wrinkled clothing, 
and his overall behavior is odd. Believing that Sheard might hide or 
destroy vital evidence if they wait to get a warrant, the officers are anxious 
to enter and examine his apartment.
Officer Shuler advises Sheard that a small child has been killed and 
that Shuler and his partner, Officer Jones, would like to come inside to 
talk with him. Sheard later testifies that he did not authorize the offi-
cers to come into his apartment but that they simply barged in without 
permission. Officer Shuler testifies that Sheard was “friendly” and said, 
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“Come in, come in, I’d like to do all I can to find out.” Later, however, 
Officer Shuler testifies during a motion to suppress evidence that he does 
not remember exactly what Sheard had said. Officer Jones testifies, “Well, 
he just stepped back. And I don’t remember if he said, come in, but I was 
under the impression that we were to enter the room by his attitude.”2
After the officers enter the apartment, they observe that the room 
is in a state of disarray: candy is strewn about on the floor, and a large, 
damp, burned area is evident on the mattress of a bed. One of the officers 
leaves to summon their superiors, and the other conducts a plain-view 
search of the area—evidence that is already exposed to view is considered 
in “plain view” and does not require a warrant to seize it. The officer sup-
posedly finds in plain view a pair of dark-green pants, with bloodstains, 
sitting on top of a hamper.
Authorities seize the pants and other evidence and take Sheard to 
the nearby precinct. A benzidine test reacts positively to the stain on the 
pants indicating that it is human blood. Additional tests of Sheard’s right 
hand and his penis also show positive for blood. Chemical analysis reveals 
that the blood on Sheard’s jacket, the dark-green slacks, the blanket and 
bedspread, and Penny’s dress and slip is type O blood (Sheard’s blood is 
type A; Penny’s was type O). Fibers from the bedspread and blanket are 
discovered on Penny’s dress and slip, on all of Sheard’s seized clothing, 
and in scrapings from the heads of both Sheard and Penny.
With the staggering amount of evidence against Sheard, a grand 
jury indicts him on February 2, 1970, for the rape-murder of Penny. The 
indictment includes four counts: felony murder, first-degree murder, 
rape, and taking indecent liberties with a minor. Sheard is found guilty 
and sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty years to life on the felony 
murder count and of ten to thirty years on the rape count.
The truth is that the two officers did not in fact find the critical 
evidence, the bloodstained pants, just sitting out in plain view. Rather, 
they—and perhaps even their superiors—probably made a conscious 
choice to exceed the search and seizure rules and to hide their violation 
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because they believed it was necessary to find the rapist-murderer of a 
five-year-old girl and because the evidence of the crime would otherwise 
have been quickly destroyed by the perpetrator.
Police officers morally justify their lying in court to compensate for what 
they see as improper rules that regularly lead to failures of justice—
complex rules that have “metastasized into a dizzying array of formalistic 
doctrines and sub-doctrines.”3 Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz 
explains, “Almost all police lie about whether they violated the Constitu-
tion in order to convict guilty defendants.”4 Even police officials concede 
that police lying in court, especially to justify improper searches, is not 
uncommon.5 It has earned its own label: “testilying.” The term was coined 
by New York City police officers apparently to help them justify in their 
own minds why it was different from normal lying under oath—while 
not legally justified, it was morally justified. “When an officer is deceptive 
in court, the rationale goes, he is ‘not quite lying’ but ‘not quite testifying 
truthfully and completely’ either. Testilying is seen as a middle ground 
between pure honesty and pure dishonesty.”6
One officer caught lying under oath said it was “standard procedure” 
and used to “counterbalance the loopholes used by drug dealers to evade 
the police.”7 An empirical study by Myron Orfield, a professor of civil 
rights law, conducted in Chicago concludes that “virtually all the offi-
cers admit that the police commit perjury, if infrequently, at suppression 
hearings.”8 (Suppression hearings are conducted to decide which evi-
dence will be allowed to be used in trial versus which evidence must be 
excluded.) The study claimed that up to 76 percent of the officers sur-
veyed had “shaded” facts in order to establish probable cause to search 
for evidence.9 Some claim that police commit perjury in 20 to 50 percent 
of cases where they have to testify regarding Fourth Amendment (exclu-
sionary rule) issues.10
Most famous among the examinations of police perjury is the 1994 
Mollen Commission report on the New York Police Department: “Police 
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perjury and falsification is a serious problem facing the department and 
the criminal justice system.” Such perjury is “probably the most common 
form of police corruption . . . particularly in connection with arrests for 
possession of narcotics and guns.”11
The Mollen Commission report spoke to the reasons for the officers’ 
willingness to lie: “In their view, irregardless of the legality of the arrest, 
the defendant is in fact guilty and ought to be arrested.” It explained that 
the officers were frustrated with the legal rules that protected criminals 
from search and seizure because the rules were perceived as “unrealistic 
rules of law.” Officers also expressed frustration about their “inability 
to stem the crime in their precinct through legal means.”12 They held a 
strong belief that perjury was acceptable because it was necessary to stem 
the tide of crime and because it was “‘doing God’s work’—doing whatever 
it takes to get a suspected criminal off the streets.”13
Other writers have made the same point: “Police view perjury as a 
necessary means to achieve the ends of justice. Constitutional rules—par-
ticularly the Exclusionary Rule—are viewed as technicalities that ‘let the 
criminal . . . go free because the constable has blundered.’”14 One study 
found that testilying began soon after cases were dismissed under the 
1961 Supreme Court holding in Mapp v. Ohio, which created the exclu-
sionary rule.15 To police, “there is a deep-seated disregard for what they 
consider to be silly little laws made by a silly little Supreme Court in a 
backroom far removed from the dangerous streets they are trying to bring 
order into.”16
Presumably, judges, like others in the system, are well aware of the 
testilying. Yet some may share the shadow vigilante sympathy motivating 
the lying and thus, while no doubt unhappy about perjury in their court, 
play along and accept the testimony as sufficient to justify the search or 
the arrest. As Alan Dershowitz reports, when officers offer perjured tes-
timony, the judge “shakes his head in knowing frustration, but accepts 
the officers’ account as credible.”17 A series of interviews revealed that 
75 percent of judges, 100 percent of public defenders, and 65 percent 
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of prosecutors “believed that judges sometimes fail to suppress evidence 
when they know police searches are illegal.”18
This is a sad state of affairs but in some ways a predictable development 
as the collection of outrageous results from the law’s “technicalities” accu-
mulates (as in some of the cases described in chapter 4 and the appendix). 
As the law increasingly loses moral credibility failing to give offenders the 
punishment they deserve, it becomes increasingly easier for shadow vigi-
lantes to justify the subversion of what they see as an immoral system. It is 
probably no coincidence that testilying is most frequently associated with 
satisfying the technicalities of search and seizure law. The same officer who 
feels comfortable lying about which side of a house’s threshold he was on 
when he made a drug seizure might think it abhorrent to lie about a matter 
related to the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Just as police officers morally justify their testilying, so too do pros-
ecutors manipulate the system out of frustration with what they see as 
the system’s common indifference to doing justice. This view frequently 
plays itself out for some prosecutors when they are presented with classic 
vigilantes trying to provide the justice that the system does not. Consider 
two examples.
PROSECUTOR RELUCTANCE TO PROSECUTE SOME VIGILANTES
No Prosecution of Vigilantes Who Beat a Child Rapist
Jane Doe grows up in the neighborhood of Hubbard Farms in south-
west Detroit, raised by her single mother.19 When Jane is eight years old 
her mother dies, and neighbors across the street and, in fact, the whole 
neighborhood pitch in to raise Jane, calling her “a daughter of the com-
munity.”20 The community feels particularly protective of Jane in part 
because she has Down syndrome. She is often seen on her front porch, 
dancing and singing along with the radio.
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On July 8, 2013, at age fifteen, Jane gets her first job at the local 
Café Con Leche. She walks the four blocks to and from work twice a 
week. These small shifts are a stepping-stone for Jane to gain more inde-
pendence. Her employer describes her as a hard worker. Less than two 
weeks later, on July 17, she does not show up for the start of her shift. Her 
employer becomes concerned and calls her guardians, who tell him that 
she has already left for work. When she finally arrives at work, Jane simply 
tells her boss that she has been with a friend.
Later that night, Jane confides to her adopted parents that she has 
been raped. Ramiro Sanchez, age forty-three, approached her and asked 
her to come inside his apartment. Once inside, he disrobed, kissed, and 
raped her. He then took nude photos of her on his cell phone. After the 
attack, Jane quickly dressed and went to work, not knowing what else to 
do. Her parents immediately notify the police. They provide Sanchez’s 
address and his description.
Jane, her parents, and the community anxiously await an investiga-
tion and charges to be pressed. It is not until two days later that a rape 
kit is finally administered. Several days later, on July 26, the parents are 
appalled to still see Sanchez walking around free. They send out a chain 
email through the tight-knit community describing the rape and rapist. 
On July 29 the community receives some reassuring news: a person 
reports seeing Sanchez being led out of his apartment by police. But just 
two days later he is released without any charges. Jane’s parents are told 
that the investigation is ongoing, but the community sees apathy and 
inattention. They are angry. A fifteen-year-old daughter of their commu-
nity with Down syndrome has been raped, and she needs support.
Fifteen days after the rape, on August 1, community leaders dis-
tribute flyers with a “Rapist Warning” and several pictures of Sanchez. 
Storefronts along the main street of the neighborhood put up the flyers 
in their front windows. Tensions and frustrations continue to build, and 
after hearing that the rape kit has not yet even been processed by the state 
police, the community explodes. A Facebook thread on the incident has 
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a post that states the following: “attention/warning: this piece of shit u 
see in this flyer raped a 16 yr old girl in our neighborhood!!! . . . me per-
sonally, if i seen him, id call the cops then i would beat the shit out of him 
myself till the cops arrive. i hate worthless scum like this. stand up for 
your hood.”21
On Monday, August 5, at around 1:00 p.m. Sanchez is spotted walking 
along the main street. A man rides up on a bicycle, jumps off, and while 
beating Sanchez shouts, “You like raping little girls?” Sanchez manages 
to escape and runs down the street, where he is attacked by a larger group 
of people. The crowd kicks and beats him until police arrive. Sanchez is 
taken to the hospital, where he is treated for his injuries. Another post 
goes up on Facebook describing how “a friend of mine caught him” and 
claims that this was “great news for southwest detroit . . . well . . . thanks 
to everyone who shared the flyer and spread the word.”22
Wayne County prosecutor Kym Worthy does not seek to arrest 
anyone in connection with the beatings. Jerome Warfield, a member of 
Detroit’s civilian commission that oversees police, says, “We do under-
stand that the neighbors were enraged.” He goes on to warn, though, 
that “vigilantism cannot be accepted when you’re impeding upon some-
body’s rights.”23 The community is torn between praising the actions of 
the vigilante mob that finally delivered some justice and condemning its 
members as criminals themselves.24 Although it is clear who participated 
in the beatings, no charges are ever brought.
We have previously noted other examples where vigilantes were not 
charged. Recall George Zimmerman’s killing of unarmed teenager 
Trayvon Martin, discussed in chapter 9. No charges were filed by the 
local authorities until the national press focused on the racial aspect of 
the case. The same was true in the case of Bernhard Goetz unnecessarily 
shooting Darrell Cabey in the subway car, discussed in chapter 3, and of 
the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles, discussed in chapter 9. What-
ever one may think of how vigilantes should ultimately be dealt with, the 
Shadow Vigilantes.indd   190 12/5/17   11:33 AM
C R I M I N A L  J U S T I C E  O F F I C I A L S  A S  S H A D O W  V I G I L A N T E S
191
potentially controversial circumstances suggest that at least some public 
examination of the events would be useful. Yet prosecutors regularly forgo 
filing charges unless forced to do so by media attention or public outcry.
Prosecutor manipulation of the system works in reverse as well, 
overcharging rather than undercharging a case, where they believe the 
system has regularly failed in the past to give an offender the punishment 
he deserved. When prosecutors finally get hold of a justice-avoiding 
offender, it is not uncommon for them to seriously overcharge the viola-
tor’s offenses or to exaggerate their claim of what constitutes an appro-
priate sentence, feeling justified by the system’s past failures to do justice. 
Consider an example.
PROSECUTORIAL OVERCHARGING TO MAKE UP FOR PAST FAILURES OF JUSTICE
Finally Getting Something on a Career Criminal
Edward Augustine, living in New Orleans, has had numerous run-ins 
with the police, but they rarely end in conviction and punishment.25 He 
has a single conviction for attempted possession of a firearm with a con-
trolled dangerous substance. He has been through the “revolving door” 
of the criminal justice system many times. Police regularly arrest him on 
drug or weapons charges, but he will later walk back out on the street. 
Sometimes it is because the police are unable to find witnesses willing 
to testify against him. In other instances, prosecutors do not proceed 
because at the time they have limited prosecution resources and “higher 
profile” cases in greater need of their efforts.26
In 2008 the new district attorney, Leon Cannizzaro, has a different 
attitude. Cannizzaro makes it office policy that no case is too insignifi-
cant to try and pursue. He makes it his mission to increase the percentage 
of cases his office will pursue from 50 percent to 90 percent.
On January 7, 2011, a New Orleans police officer observes a car 
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making an unlawful right turn at a red light. The officer turns on his lights 
and siren to pull the car over, but the car speeds away. The officer follows 
the vehicle, and as he pulls up beside it, he sees the driver, Augustine, 
dumping white powder out of the car window.
The officer chases Augustine for several blocks but stops when Augus-
tine enters a one-way street. Augustine accidentally hits another vehicle. 
Augustine gets out of his car and flees. The officer pursues him on foot. 
As Augustine attempts to climb a fence in a nearby alley, the officer Tases 
him and places him under arrest.
Upon returning to the scene of the crash, the officer learns that 
Augustine has killed the passenger in the other vehicle, a college freshman 
who had returned home for the Christmas holidays. The officer also finds 
numerous packages of heroin in Augustine’s possession. It also comes to 
light that the car being driven by Augustine has been reported missing by 
its owner, the mother of Augustine’s girlfriend.
District Attorney Cannizzaro is unhappy that this career criminal has 
been allowed to pass through the system on so many occasions without 
facing any serious punishment. He believes that by not aggressively pros-
ecuting earlier narcotics cases, the system was in effect “creating mon-
sters.”27 He is determined to pursue Augustine aggressively to try to make 
up for past failings of the office.
He charges Augustine with manslaughter for causing the death in the 
accident, for which Augustine ultimately gets, at Cannizzaro’s urging, 
a fifty-year sentence. Cannizzaro also charges Augustine with posses-
sion with intent to distribute illegal drugs—the drugs he dumped out 
the window—and, again at Cannizzaro’s urging, Augustine gets an addi-
tional sentence of fifty years. While Augustine did not have his girlfriend’s 
mother’s express permission to drive her car on that occasion, the woman 
does not wish to press charges. Cannizzaro nonetheless adds this offense 
to the list and gets another twenty years added onto Augustine’s sentence, 
for a total sentence of 120 years—a sentence several times longer than 
what even an intentional murder would typically get.28
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In this form of shadow vigilantism by prosecutors (and judges), the offi-
cials feel morally justified in manipulating the system in order to compen-
sate for past failures of justice.
Prosecutorial overcharging is of two sorts: vertical overcharging, in 
which the prosecutor charges offenses for which he or she has insufficient 
proof to convict, and horizontal overcharging, in which the prosecutor 
charges a series of overlapping offenses arising from the same criminal act.29 
In the latter type, prosecutors charge every offense for which a defendant 
might theoretically satisfy the offense definition, no matter how overlap-
ping the offenses may be. Thus, a prosecutor might take a standard rape 
case—using force to compel intercourse—and add on “assault, kidnap-
ping, gross sexual imposition, etc.”30 This is made possible because most 
American criminal codes, in which the state’s criminal laws are collected, 
grow over time to have a vast collection of overlapping offenses.31
Legislatures have been constantly adding new offenses, sometimes 
making the code seven or eight times longer than its original form based 
on the Model Penal Code, but without substantially expanding the 
code’s coverage.32 So, for example, most states now have an offense of 
“carjacking,” after a series of newspaper headlines about such conduct. 
Does anyone doubt that such conduct was already punished severely as 
armed robbery (as well as auto theft, kidnapping, assault, etc.)? Adding 
one more offense to charge was an act of potential showmanship, not 
criminal code improvement.
The forests of overlapping offenses exist in large part because pros-
ecutors have politically promoted them. Prosecutors have put political 
muscle into supporting a constant stream of new offenses that typically 
are just added on top of the old ones. To protect this ability to bring mul-
tiple charges, they have repeatedly opposed criminal code reforms that 
would streamline codes and eliminate unnecessary overlaps. For example, 
in a new criminal law codification undertaken in Illinois in 2003, which 
had as one of its primary aims the consolidation of overlapping offenses, 
the recodification was ultimately blocked by the political opposition of 
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prosecutors.33 The prosecutors instead sponsored a new reform commis-
sion that kept the redundancies in the current code.34
Prosecutors’ moral justification for excessive charging might rest on 
any or all of several different claims, the same sorts of claims heard from 
police to justify their testilying. First, the criminal justice process has so 
many barriers to an offender getting the liability and punishment he or 
she deserves that such excess is needed just to end up with something that 
approximates what is really deserved.35 In other words, the prosecutor 
feels that by putting on several extra charges he is getting some insurance. 
That way, no matter what the court does, the defendant is less likely to 
escape all punishment. With this insurance policy, the defendant may not 
do the maximum time but he’ll get some sanction. Second, it makes sense 
to try to get more liability and punishment than an offender deserves 
for the offense because, given the gross ineffectiveness of the system, the 
current offense may be just the tip of the iceberg of the offenses he or she 
has actually committed.36
Finally, many people care little if the overcharging generates unde-
served liability for both present and unpunished past offenses. That is not 
something that ought to be a concern to prosecutors because the criminal 
justice system has given up any pretense about being a search for justice. 
It is simply a system of mutual combat between the defense counsel and 
prosecutors, with winners and losers, the goal of which is to always win 
and to never lose. Just as the defense counsel see their job as always getting 
the least punishment they can for their guilty clients, prosecutors, in a 
symmetrical fashion, should see their job as getting as much punishment 
as they can for guilty defendants.37
Strategic overcharging might seem to the uninitiated to be too uneth-
ical to be done openly. But the increasing game-like features of the system 
have dulled participants’ sensibilities. Indeed, one need only look at similar 
manipulative conduct by federal judges before the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 stopped the practice. Federal law at the time required that 
all offenders be eligible for early release by the United States Parole Com-
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mission no later than after serving one-third of their sentence. Judges who 
were uncomfortable with this early release could, and did, short-circuit the 
system by simply determining the sentence they really wanted, then tripling 
it.38 Thus, offenders would become eligible for release only after serving 
the full term the judges thought appropriate. Prosecutors may be making 
similar sorts of strategic manipulations when they overcharge.
It was in part this judicial manipulative practice that contributed to the 
enactment of the “truth in sentencing” provisions of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984. People had become increasingly skeptical of the sentences 
that were publicly imposed because they always ended in early release. The 
new act requires that an offender serve at least 85 percent of the sentence 
imposed—an attempt to earn back some credibility for the system.39
WHY SHADOW VIGILANTISM IS SO DANGEROUS,  
MORE DANGEROUS THAN CLASSIC VIGILANTISM
It could be argued that the manipulations and subversions inspired by 
shadow vigilantism—of both the official sort discussed in this chapter 
and the citizen sort discussed in the previous chapter—are not something 
that, as a practical matter, ought to be of significant concern. We can for 
the most part ignore these problems because they are only a minor part 
of the criminal justice process. But the truth is that shadow vigilantism is 
dramatically more damaging than classic vigilantism.
First, the effect of shadow vigilantism is less dramatic but more perva-
sive. Shadow vigilantism appeals not just to the unusual person or group 
willing to be a classic vigilante—willing to openly violate the law in serious 
ways—but also to more ordinary people. Many people who cannot bring 
themselves to commit explicit lawlessness can bring themselves to under-
mine and subvert, through noncooperation, lying, or other lower-level 
misconduct, a system that they see as being immorally indifferent to 
serious wrongdoing.
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Imagine all the neighbors in the chapter 8 cases who refused to help 
authorities pursue the classic vigilantes. As we asked in chapter 9, if those 
neighbors were sitting on a jury for the vigilantes, would they be likely 
to vote to acquit? If they were the grand jurors or prosecutor in the case, 
would they want to avoid bringing charges? If they were voting on a pro-
posal to change the rules that led to the failure of justice, would they vote 
for the change and for a politician who supported the change? It seems 
highly likely that they would do so in all these instances. The fact that an 
entire neighborhood can show its willingness to succumb to a shadow 
vigilante impulse shows the potential sweep of the problem.
Further, shadow vigilantism is more problematic than the classic form 
because the criminal justice system cannot effectively deter it in the way it 
can classic vigilantism. The shadow vigilantes’ conduct may be criminal in 
some cases, but it also may be only unethical or unjust or unfair in others. 
The failure to report a crime or to assist investigators is commonly not a 
crime in the United States.40 And even if it is criminal, it cannot be effec-
tively deterred. If prosecutors have no witness to the crime itself, how can 
they find a witness to a witness’ failure to report the crime?
Even if the shadow vigilantes’ actions are not morally justified (under 
chapter 5’s rules), they may well believe that they are.41 They probably see 
themselves in the way civil disobedience protesters might see themselves: 
they know that what they are doing is inconsistent with the law in spirit if 
not in fact, but they see the violation as morally justified by the law’s own 
immorality in its indifference to doing justice.
Worse, while shadow vigilantism cannot be as effectively deterred as 
classic vigilantism can, it is at the same time even more damaging than the 
latter. Classic vigilantism, by operating openly, serves as a public protest 
against the system’s failures of justice—a call to the system to correct itself. 
In contrast, shadow vigilantism is generally unseen: failure to cooperate 
with police and prosecutors, not reporting crimes when they are com-
mitted, jury nullification; improper exercise of discretion in charging, 
sentencing, and other criminal justice decisions; and political support 
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for unjust punishment policies. It provides no public call for reform but 
instead seeks to remain in the shadows.
Further, shadow vigilantism introduces into the criminal justice 
system serious arbitrariness as well as disparity among cases. That is 
the level of shadow vigilantism in any given case may be unpredictable, 
dependent as it is on a variety of factors. That may change from case to 
case. The officer in one case may be testilying while the officer in an iden-
tical case may not be. A witness in one case may refuse to report a crime 
while the witness in another case may report it. And so on. The operation 
of the criminal justice system then is rendered wholly arbitrary; identical 
cases end in very different outcomes.
And this resulting arbitrariness and disparity only contribute in the 
long run to the system’s reputation as being less predictable, more arbi-
trary, and more unjust. In other words, shadow vigilantism only serves 
to exacerbate the system’s loss of moral credibility, which is what helped 
trigger the vigilantism in the first place. It invites a downward spiral of 
lost credibility and therefore increased subversion.
In fact, the destructive dynamic of the downward spiral is even worse 
than this, as the next chapter details.
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